I propose to show that, in their Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT), Lakoff and his collaborators do not offer a new account of metaphor but rather a wide-ranging representation of analogies, reconstructed on the basis of selected linguistic material (primarily collocations and idioms). Consequently, CMT is valuable not as an explanation of metaphorical language in use, nor a hypothesis about the genesis and development of concepts in individual minds, but primarily as a way to represent the results of unexplored social processes of lexicalization involving metaphor. If one adopts a more 'ecological', situated perspective, this global, post hoc approach may perhaps provide useful material to speculate on the forces that drive meaning extension in history.
INTRODUCTION
, '"metaphor" is a loose word, at best, and we must beware of attributing to it stricter rules of usage than are actually found in practice'. Black's point concerns a specific issue: differentiation of similar metaphors in discourse; but it may well be extended to any phenomena that go by this name. Whenever one wants to say something specific about the nature of metaphor, one should try to keep in mind the full range of entities labeled 'metaphorical' and place one's view within this wider horizon (see Section 5 for a sketch of this range). Black's advice is especially pertinent when one undertakes to define metaphor in a way that is strikingly different from standard usage and, at the same time, aims to revolutionize the whole field of metaphor research, as is the case with Lakoff and Johnson's proposal. It seems imperative then to relate their claims to traditional attempts that probe metaphor from different sides. I believe that Lakoff -the spiritus movens of the whole enterprise, 1 who has repeatedly underlined its importance -did not pay enough attention to this necessary aspect of metaphor research, possibly because he was convinced of 1 Lakoff's further cooperation with Johnson centred on their philosophical position called 'experientialism' or 'embodied realism' (Lakoff & Johnson 1999 . Regarding metaphor -before veering towards a neuronal account (Lakoff 2008a: 17-38) , which is outside the remit of this paper, Lakoff cooperated with e.g. Kövecses (Lakoff 1987a -the case study of 'anger'; cf. Kövecses 1986 Kövecses , 1988 Kövecses , 1990 , Brugman (Lakoff 1987a -the case study of 'over'), and Turner (Lakoff & Turner 1989) .
involving linguistic evidence. In Section Four, I try to show that the definitions of conceptual metaphor that Lakoff and Johnson offer do not cover metaphorical phenomena; I propose that CMT should be understood primarily as a (highly) speculative empiricist theory of meaning extension rather than a theory of metaphor. To corroborate my view, in Section Five I reverse their post hoc perspective, starting from the phenomena to discuss the different types of 'work' performed by metaphor. In Section Six, I suggest reinterpreting CMT's results. I added the final section, Section
Seven, in response to reviewers' comments. There, I briefly present a general and systematic account of the work of metaphor, following (Prandi 2004) ; and, from a hermeneutic perspective, tentatively probe a fundamental issue that may be labeled 'the primacy of metaphor'.
AN AMBIGUOUS AGENDA
Apart from the title, several indications in Metaphors We Live By suggest that Lakoff and Johnson subscribe to the Romantic view of metaphor, according to which metaphor is not merely linguistic ornament but 'the omnipresent principle of language' (Richards 1965: 92) . 6 This position was famously articulated by Shelley, to be revived by Richards:
[Their] language is vitally metaphorical; that is, it marks the before unapprehended relations of things and perpetuates their apprehension until words, which represent them, become, through time, signs for portions or classes of thought instead of pictures of integral thoughts: and then, if no new poets should arise to create afresh the associations which have been thus disorganised, language will be dead to all the nobler purposes of human intercourse (Richards 1965: 90-91;  Shelley 1821: Sentence 22).
The initial pronoun 'their' refers to 'poets, in the most universal sense of the word' (Sentence 21).
Later, Shelley specifies (Sentence 25): 'in the infancy of society every author is necessarily a poet, because language itself is poetry'. The conception of 'poetic origins of language' involving metaphor may seem extravagant; I will return to this at the end of my paper. Here, it is enough to note that, in the Romantic view, culture is to be perceived as a field of continuous struggle between the forces of ossification (everyday use of language) and renewal (use of poetic metaphor). This vision may be onesided: it apparently overplays the role in social life of 'strong metaphors' (Black 1993: 26) and plays down non-poetic use of metaphor in daily discourse. Nevertheless, I believe it rightly identifies the essence of metaphor with linguistic creativity: the power to express 'integral thoughts' or revelations of various magnitude.
In opening their book, Lakoff and Johnson (1980: ix) announce that metaphor is 'a matter of central concern, perhaps the key to giving an adequate account of understanding'; by the conclusion, they present it as a new way of accessing reality (1980: 239):
6 Leezenberg (2001: 16 ) holds a similar view.
It is as though the ability to comprehend experience through metaphor were a sense, like seeing or touching or hearing, with metaphors providing the only ways to perceive and experience much of the world. Metaphor is as much a part of our functioning as our sense of touch, and as precious.
The authors openly invoke the Romantic idea of 'imaginative understanding', with the proviso that imagination is not 'completely unconstrained'. They claim to provide 'an account of how understanding uses the primary resources of the imagination via metaphor and how it is possible to give experience new meaning and to create new realities ' (1980: 228) . 7 At the same time, one learns that their subject matter is not 'poetic imagination' and 'extraordinary' language but 'ordinary language' -even more so the 'ordinary conceptual system' that underlies it, residing in the 'cognitive unconscious', which they regularly invoke in subsequent publications. Consequently, the title of the book is to be read as '[metaphorically structured] concepts we live by ' (1980: 3) . The authors' declared aim is to explore empirically this metaphorical system of concepts, primarily on the basis of literal language.
At first sight, Lakoff and Johnson's agenda is baffling. While they extoll metaphor in a way reminiscent of the Romantic tradition -indispensable, opening up new vistas, providing the underlying principle of language and a primary tool of imagination -they say it is operative in ordinary language. They even dub it 'literal metaphor' to distinguish it from 'imaginative (or nonliteral)
metaphor ' (1980: 53) : i.e., underlying figurative language. In their theory, literal metaphor, expressed in conventional language -normally thought to consist of 'dead metaphors' -is supposed to be the most alive (1980: 55) . Metaphor and imagination -normally placed in the domain of individual creativity -are automatic, mostly generic processes that produce mappings between conceptual domains that can be scientifically identified and modeled. In his later work Lakoff regularly presents himself as a cognitive scientist who studies the unconscious systems of concepts (e.g. 1996: 3-5) .
Metaphors We Live By thus appeals to opposing audiences: readers who believe that metaphor is important because it epitomizes the power of the human spirit -the mystery of creative articulation:
lifting the human species out of the realm of purely biological necessities and 'rolling back the world's horizon', to use the imagery of Gadamer -as well as those who believe that any phenomena, including those deemed spiritual or mysterious, are surface manifestations of underlying objective regularities that science can discover. Many who find that opposition of perspectives constraining if not downright wrongheaded see the appeal of Lakoff and Johnson's project exactly in the promise of reconciliation. A search for the rules of imaginative understanding -more generally, for a 'third way'
between 'the myths of objectivism and subjectivism ' (1980: 185ff.) -fosters hopes in a new synthesis.
I believe that the opposition of perspectives on metaphor, language, meaning, etc., is real enough, even while Lakoff and Johnson do not even attempt to do justice to it. On the philosophical level, they choose not to discuss 'certain trends in Continental thought' they claim to be 'serious attempts to 7 I believe it is this Romantic rhetoric that earns them a place in a summa of the writings on imagination down through the centuries (see Brann 1991) .
provide a basis for the human sciences', but rather take on 'cafe phenomenology' as the target of their criticism (1980: 223-224 
IS CMT AN EMPIRICAL BREAKTHROUGH?
In his contribution to the second edition of Metaphor and Thought (Ortony 1993 ) -originally a collection of papers from a 1977 conference, by leading authorities in the field -Lakoff opposes his approach, which he rather grandiosely labels 'the contemporary theory of metaphor', to the standard view (1993: 204):
The bulk of the chapters in this book were written before the development of the contemporary field of metaphor research. My chapter will therefore contradict much that appears in the others, many of which make certain assumptions that were widely taken for granted in 1977. A major assumption that is challenged by contemporary research is the traditional division between literal and figurative language, with metaphor as a kind of figurative language.
Clearly, Lakoff presents his approach as empirical discovery that makes many traditional, fundamental distinctions obsolete. As he put it even more trenchantly (1987b: 147):
If nothing else, it is important to be aware of the theory-dependent status of traditional terms such as literal and dead metaphor. They carry old and demonstrably false theories with them, and, if not carefully used, they will presuppose those old theories and stifle discussion of contemporary research.
I propose considering two questions. First, is CMT an empirical breakthrough? Second, does is challenge the traditional identification of metaphor? Before proceeding, I would note that, contrary to Lakoff's charge, the terms 'literal' and 'dead metaphor' need not be theory dependent. The distinctions 8 That they deal with 'subjectivism' in two pages, while their account of 'objectivism' takes almost thirty pages (1980: 195-222) , clearly indicates their focus and limitations. In later works (Johnson 1987 , Lakoff & Johnson 1999 , one finds no direct encounter with Continental thought, even though, as mentioned, Lakoff and Johnson seem to see themselves as its continuators. 9 Continental philosophy -or hermeneutic phenomenology -cannot adequately be characterised as subjectivist. Rather, it is anti-naturalistic: i.e., opposed to the view that scientific explanations of nature are sufficient and can be extended to cover all of human reality. (Note that Lakoff and Johnson's project is openly naturalistic: see e.g. Johnson 1992 , Lakoff & Johnson 1999 . It sees nothing wrong with scientific attempts to probe and dispel putative mysteries, so long as one recognizes that models of objective correlations, for all their success in explaining reality, are not the end of the story, not least because they necessarily rely on unexplained 'givens'. Thoughtful scientists admit as much: e.g., 'brains that pulse with certain patterns of electrical activity are conscious. Why? They just are' (Donald 2001: 178 11 and not pretend they are victims of terminological prejudice. Most often, unless they provide a convincing argument that they are talking about phenomena commonly called metaphorical, they simply change the subject. Lakoff attempted to provide such an argument in two publications (1986, 1987b) , which I will discuss in the next section.
What are the proposed justifications for the claim that metaphor is not primarily a kind of figurative language but rather a mapping -or set of correspondences -between conceptual domains?
In A portion of the conceptual network of battle partially characterizes the concept of an argument, and the language follows suit. Since metaphorical expressions in our language are tied to metaphorical concepts in a systematic way, we can use metaphorical linguistic expressions to study the nature of metaphorical concepts and to gain an understanding of the metaphorical nature of our activities (Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 7, emphasis added) .
As I have pointed out, both Chomsky and Lakoff -despite important differences -subscribe to this position. Linguistic mentalism may be fertile ground for research, as is clearly the case with generative grammar; I will venture some suggestions to this effect in Section Six. Philosophically, however, the assumption of an unconscious conceptual system that shapes intelligent behaviour is not viable. 12 As 10 These may follow when researchers try to specify the meaning of 'literal' (see Searle 1978 for references) or 'metaphorical'. Metaphor, in this vague and general sense, is a 'supertrope'. It may subsequently be specified as one type in an array of tropes: a challenging task. For a literary attempt, see (Purcell 1990 (2) Import as much of the generic-level structure of the source as is consistent with the first condition.
Lakoff toyed with the empiricist idea 13 that mappings are simple transfers of the cognitive topology of the source domain (1990: 54), possibly running automatically; later he returned to the original proviso that such mappings are constrained by the topology of the target (1993: 215-216) . Consequentlythough Lakoff has never drawn this conclusion -they are better described as blending (Engstrom 1999 , Fauconnier & Turner 2002 . To the best of my knowledge, Lakoff has also never answered Brugman's criticism (1990: 262-5 ) that hypothetical metaphorical mappings do not play any role in interpretation of a concept in use, since a concept functions holistically -as a unit -in any given context -as opposed to its possible analytical decomposition in some theoretical model. Neither has he raised the problem of 'gist extraction' (Fauconnier 1997: 188 , footnotes 1 and 2): i.e., how the conceptual structure to be mapped or blended can be recruited automatically, according to rules. This problem recurs in all structuralist accounts of meaning that try to account for contextual use in terms of a proposed abstract system.
As opposed to blending theory 14 , CMT does not focus on concepts in use, but rather aims to explain the development of the system of concepts supposedly underlying the lexicon. One must ask, 13 Chomsky, in his criticism of Skinner, rejects empiricist explanations of language acquisition and higher mental processes (1967 [1959] ); he has consistently based his linguistic mentalism on nativist assumptions (for an evolutionary critique, see Deacon 1997: 35, 103ff.) . Lakoff, on the other hand, has adopted a syncretist position he originally called 'experientialism' (later, 'embodied realism'), without facing the deeper issues in the debate between rationalists and empiricists. This is evident in his and Johnson's answer (2002: 248 ) to Rakova's charge (2002) that they espouse 'extreme empiricism'. For an evolutionary critique of CMT and an alternative account following (Donald 1991) , see (Zlatev 2007b ).
14 The relationship between CMT and blending theory merits separate treatment. In the most recent articulation of their positions, Lakoff (2008: 30ff.) 
IS CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR A METAPHOR?
In Metaphors We Live By, Lakoff and Johnson define 'the essence of metaphor' as 'understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another ' (1980: 5, emphasis original) . This formulation may seem initially almost acceptable, if only because it is left unspecified. On this basis, one could think that a contextual re-description or re-classification of an entity affords better insight; and one concludes that the authors have in mind an act of understanding, based on analogy. Meawhile, 'experiencing' at this stage remains mysterious: a point I will return to at the end of this section.
The cognitive importance of metaphor's ability to express analogy was recognized already by
Aristotle (see e.g. Kittay 1987: 2-4) . He shows that the phrase 'sowing around a god-created flame' is based on analogy: the act it expresses stands in the same relation to its object -'the Sun shining' / 'particular rays of light' -as sowing does to the corn seed (1987 [1457b 26-30] ). He famously concludes: 'but the greatest thing, by far, is to be a master of metaphor. It is the one thing that cannot 15 In general, 'there is a major problem with using only linguistic evidence to argue for functional relations between thought and language' (Keysar et al. 2000: 577, in be learnt from others; and it is also a sign of genius since a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of similarity of dissimilars. Through resemblance, metaphor makes things clearer' (1459a 5-7, quoted in Kittay 1987: 2).
Aristotle talks about poetic language; but contemporary research provides ample evidence of the general cognitive power of analogical thinking. 17 So Schön writes (1993: 139-143 ) that a problem with a new paintbrush -the synthetic bristle did not paint smoothly -was solved when someone in the design group observed that a paintbrush is a kind of pump. The analogy helped the group to change their focus from the shape of the bristles to the gaps between them. Such anecdotal evidence clearly
shows that analogical thinking is far from automatic. A flash of illumination -the 'aha!' phenomenon -must be prepared. Before they solved the problem, the design group inspected all the potentially relevant features of paintbrushes affecting their performance. Analogical reasoning must also be appropriated reflectively: following the flash of illumination, one must find the relevance -and the limits -of the analogy. In consequence, the unconscious global transfers of conceptual structure that CMT postulates as underlying contextual acts of understanding do not make cognitive sense. In sum, even though the initial definition of metaphor could seem (almost) plausible, its subsequent specification as a global analogy -metaphor is a mapping or a set of correspondences between conceptual domains (e.g. Notice that Lakoff's distinctions are idiosyncratic. It is hard to see the point of distinguishing (1) from (2). In both cases, 'literal' has the meaning 'the way people normally (conventionally) talk about things' -even if the linguistic conventions of an in-group may look metaphorical to an outsider. It is also hard to understand why (3) and (4) should have the same standing as (1) and (2), since they refer to particular theories of 'literal' rather than any ordinary understanding of the term. Instead of explicating, Lakoff merely obfuscates the central phenomenon -metaphorical language goes beyond 17 See (Gentner 1998) for references. 18 A comment by an anonymous reviewer about 'framing' -and a subsequent perusal of (Prandi 2004 ) -helped me realize that, in some cases, more-or-less global analogical integration of concepts is possible. However, such analogies merely express conceptually consistent content. I was unable to integrate this new material into my account and so have appended it to the final section.
conventional ways of putting things, whether by laymen or specialists -by placing it in the context of theoretical attempts to specify or re-define 'literal' and, consequently, 'metaphorical'.
Lakoff's discussion of 'dead' metaphor is even less tractable. He distinguishes four cases, exemplified by the words pedigree, dunk, comprehend, and grasp, and says that 'traditional theory would lump them all together as dead metaphors' even though, according to CMT, they are significantly different (1987b: 146-147) . Again he conceals the real issue: when metaphorical expressions become conventionalized or 'lexicalized', they are taken as literal. Such 'dead' metaphors -as they are rather prematurely called in English -may be 'awakened' or 'revitalized' (Müller 2008 , Nöth 1995 ; but such acts of resuscitation do not change their literal status as lexical units.
In both cases, Lakoff does not accept the standard of conventionalization -which is normally criterial for literal language or metaphor 'death'; so he changes the subject. He is forced to re-define 'literal'. He postulates an extensive primary level of pre-conceptual image schemas and 'basic level' concepts, which supposedly emerge spontaneously when people interact with their environment. The rest of the conceptual system is assumed to result (mostly) from culturally based semantic transfers.
This helps explain why, in defining metaphor, Lakoff and Johnson talk about 'experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another ' (1980: 5) and so anticipate their theory of how concepts are grounded. As they state in Chapter 12 (1980: 59; emphasis original): '…what we are claiming about grounding is that we typically conceptualize the nonphysical in terms of the physical -that is, we conceptualize the less clearly delineated in terms of the more clearly delineated. The ambiguous phrase 'in terms of' -which I initially interpreted as 'describe or express in other terms' so as to place
Lakoff and Johnson's definition in line with standard usage 19 -turns out to invoke an empiricist scenario of concept formation. 'Physical' concepts are supposed to lend their naturally emergent structure to 'cultural' concepts through metaphor, as in the sequence (1980: 59):
(1) Harry is in the kitchen.
(2) Harry is in the Elks.
(3) Harry is in love.
For Lakoff and Johnson, the concept of containment (IN) emerges directly in physical experience.
Thus, the first sentence is literal, the remaining ones metaphorical (SOCIAL GROUPS / EMOTIONS
ARE CONTAINERS). This scenario of concept formation is empirically untenable in light of
Vygosky's (1962) and Piaget's (2000; see also Rakova 2002) findings, which show that concepts do not arise spontaneously at the level of sensorimotor intelligence, but rather through a long process of symbolic social interaction. Their results are confirmed by recent work in evolutionary psychology (Donald 1991; Deacon 1997; Zlatev 2007a Zlatev , 2007b Zlatev , 2008 reverse the perspective and start with a description of metaphorical phenomena, primarily to reveal the cognitive work metaphor performs. In Section Six, I will re-frame CMT against this background.
METAPHOR IN ACTION
Recall Black's advice: one should try not to restrict metaphorical phenomena prematurely. It seems reasonable to start with a definition that is clearly too broad and narrow it down. Aristotle defines metaphor as the 'application of a word that belongs to another thing'. His definition is based on his ontology of genera and species, so he talks about a transference 'from genus to species, species to genus, species to species, or by analogy ' (1987 [1457b] ). His explication is of no theoretical concern, as no one believes any longer in the coincidence of language and reality or the idea that things have names that intrinsically belong to them. Metonymy is closer to metaphor narrowly understood: in both cases, non-literal words are used in a transferred sense. Metonymy is usually thought to be simpler than metaphor, as the transference normally concerns another entity from the same pragmatically active domain, and metonomy serves mostly referential purposes: e.g., 'the ham sandwich is waiting for his check' (Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 35; emphasis original), where the italicized words stand for a customer. Note that the name 'figure of speech' -inherited from the rhetorical tradition centred on literary research -hardly seems appropriate in such pragmatically motivated and mundane cases of meaning transfer, which often underlie semantic shifts in the lexicon: e.g., board for 'accommodation with meals' or 'governing body'.
The simplest case of metaphor is equally mundane and plays a similar role in language. It may be termed catachresis, which is normally defined pejoratively as 'improper use of words' or 'application disregarded the significance of Piaget's findings completely (Piatelli-Palmarini 1995: 373-6) . 21 I have not presented attempts to find a place in CMT for 'live' metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson 1980 : 52-53, Lakoff & Turner 1989 . I suggest that live metaphors are better represented as post hoc blends, created after one chooses an interpretation. 22 As my anonymous reviewers rightly pointed out, Aristotle's definition is really too narrow for my purposes, and my account of his position is highly schematic. I invoke -or abuse -Aristotle to make the hopefully uncontroversial point that metaphor, in the most unspecified sense, concerns non-literal use of words.
of a term to a thing which it does not properly denote' (OED quoted by Black 1962: 33, Footnote 8).
That said, such 'misuse' may be welcome if it serves 'to remedy a gap in the vocabulary' (catachresis inopiae causa); so that 'the new sense will quickly become part of the literal sense' (Black 1962: 33, emphasis original) . Though true, this description is too narrow: the driving force behind semantic shifts is not only a perceived shortage of literal expressions but also a felt need to be more expressive.
This is why one finds so many synonyms in the lexicon for the entities that matter to people (Geeraerts 1988) . A metaphorical extension of meaning -e.g., a computer mouse -differs from a metonym because it is normally based on expressive similarity rather than pragmatic contiguity.
As defined above, catachresis lacks the distinctive feature of metaphorical expression narrowly defined -which, in the oft quoted phrase of Samuel Johnson, 'gives us two ideas for one' (Richards 1965: 118 Cognitive work is necessary whenever a metaphorical expression is not transparent: when it does not lead directly to the intended meaning. Since mouse is clearly referential and the original referent independently available, hitting on this suggestive name required inspiration -but only very little insight to recognize its meaning and accept it as suitable. The situation changes when a metaphorical expression or vehicle is not initially transparent to a particular semantic content: its tenor (Richards 1965: 96) . These terms may be easier to explain if one invokes a pictorial metaphor used in advertising: e.g., a petrol station (tenor) and a jumping tiger (vehicle). The tenor -the referential situation -is conventionally understood as 'one's brand of petrol', the vehicle as 'a tiger's leap'. On Richards's interactionist account (1965: 93) , 'when we use a metaphor we have two thoughts of different things active together and supported by a single word, or phrase, whose meaning is a resultant of their interaction'. It is important to recognize that the metaphorical vehicle is not the metaphor: it provides a perspective on the tenor (Kittay 1987 feature of the signans shared with its signatum. In the case of indices, it is a natural relation joining the two: e.g., cause and effect. In the case of symbols, it is a matter of convention. Since metaphors are symbolic, they can be called 'iconic metasigns' (Nöth 1995: 123, 133) . To understand this label, notice that the metaphor in the previous paragraph signifies by reference to other signs: specifically, by reference to the similarity between their objects. Little cognitive work is involved. The metaphor can easily be interpreted because the commercial intention is in clear view, while the contextually relevant signata -'the petrol's energy for driving' and 'the tiger's energy unleashed in the jump' -have enough common structure to blend successfully: e.g., 'the petrol will give your car increased energy'. The metaphor may be felt to remain alive, since it may equally well evoke more specific interpretations:
e.g., 'with this petrol, you can easily overtake other drivers', 'you are the master of the road', 'you can impress the other sex'. The metaphor's level of live-ness is apparently linked to the interpreter's willingness to accept various conventional features of the vehicle's object -'speed', 'power', 'attractiveness' -as potentially shaping, or 'framing', the message. Early in the morning, while all things are crisp with frost, men come with fishing reels and slender lunch, and let down their fine lines through the snowy field to take pickerel and perch; wild men, who instinctively follow other fashions and trust other authorities than their townsmen, and by their goings and comings stitch towns in parts where else they would be ripped.
Wild men -one is told -'stitch' towns together. The metaphorical vehicle has as its object the anglers' outings (tenor). It is easy to see the similarity between vehicle and tenor: the 'ground' of metaphor in Richards's terminology (1965: 117) . The footprints in the snow resemble stitches from a bird's eye view, while 'goings and comings' are as repetitive as stitching. The meaning of the metaphor can be paraphrased as 'the anglers join the towns by their footprints'. Note that this literal interpretation does not convey the metaphor's full meaning. The physical movements of the anglers -'wild men' who do not really belong in towns -are viewed as an important unifying activity. I believe that Thoreau perceives them as Nature's envoys, inadvertently restituting its unity, partly destroyed by towns.
What mental work is necessary to produce and understand the metaphor? In general terms, one must be able to express (the writer) or adopt (the readers) an unusual perspective -unusual, that is, for town-dwellers, but quite normal for someone like Thoreau. Towns are causing rifts in Nature; the anglers' outings are Nature's response to the threat. Thoreau's task is to help his readers reconfigure the 24 In context, it could mean other things. 'Literal' meaning is ascribed in a minimal context, as in a dictionary. 25 My presentation owes much to Perrin's insightful analysis.
standard bourgeois view of things: from their perspective, the anglers' outings are marginal, the towns linked by roads; nature is empty space waiting to be civilized. A gestalt flip is required.
Thoreau struggles to formulate what is, from his vantage point, the anglers' real role. He calls them 'wild men': a label that would conventionally suggest -at least to townsfolk -lack of civility or lack of restraint. Here, it means that they belong to nature rather than civilization. Thoreau explains that they 'instinctively follow other fashions and trust other authorities'. The reader may understand that they are sent on an errand: that they heed the call of someone more powerful. Only in this context does stitch make sense. From the bourgeois perspective, 'wild men' cannot be rather expected to 'stitch': a woman's job requiring patience and conscientiousness. More importantly, the anglers make no coordinated efforts to achieve the goal: to avert the threat posed to Nature by the towns; 'stitching' is a byproduct of their activities. One is meant to view them as instruments of Nature, which guides their movements and is ultimately responsible for the 'stitching'.
As the metaphor's author, Thoreau starts with a vivid experience of the tenor: in his mind's eye, he perceives the anglers' outings as a restorative activity masterminded by Nature. To express his vision, he needs a suitable vehicle that can describe both the anglers' activity and its role in Nature's order. The use of the word stitch is contingent, 26 perhaps motivated by the activation of the semantic field of clothing and fabric ('fashions') and by the bird's eye perspective on the winter scene, which provides the common schema: the similarity motivating this iconic metasign. So long as the scene is not crystallized into a particular image, the original intention can find other vehicles. It often happens in a text that a metaphor is 'corrected': replaced or complemented by another, when the author realizes that his first choice carries unwelcome suggestions or is not fully adequate to his vision.
As a reader, one has no access to the author's lived experience. One can only try to piece together the clues provided. In the present case, one must first solve the 'riddle' of the metaphor: why was stitch used? The task is easy because the tenor is tangible: the context makes it clear what the vehicle refers to, and the common schema can be extracted. However, the job of understanding the metaphor remains. One must grasp the situation from a new perspective, and this requires the suspension of standard assumptions. Only when the new perspective is adopted -only when nature actually is perceived as a piece of cloth torn by human activity -can stitch be understood with no cognitive effort. Only then may it become a literal expression.
One can now see better why Lakoff and Johnson's theory of conceptual metaphor is not about live metaphor, or metaphor sans phrase, despite their claims to the contrary (Lakoff & Johnson 1999: 69-70 ; emphasis original): '…the theory of the novel cases is the same as the theory of the conventional cases. Thus, the theory of conceptual cross-domain mapping is exactly the theory needed to account for traditional cases of novel metaphorical expressions. It is thus best called a theory of metaphor'.
Recalling statements I have quoted previously -it is not really true that 'the essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another' (Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 5, 26 If so, the metaphor would not be 'emphatic', in Black's terminology (1993: 26).
emphasis added) or that 'we typically conceptualize the nonphysical in terms of the physical -that is, we conceptualize the less clearly delineated in terms of the more clearly delineated ' (1980: 59, emphasis original) . The situation is much more complex than such an empiricist scenario suggests.
By definition, lived -as opposed to vicarious -experience is always direct. For Thoreau, the experience of the tenor -the anglers' outings -is not only direct but also, one assumes, well delineated and immediately understood, since Thoreau normally treats nature as an organic unity or self-mending piece of fabric. For his bourgeois readers, on the other hand, such 'outings' would conventionally be understood as an unimportant, private pastime. Live metaphor is essentially about making available to one's audience an individual, rich, concrete experience in intersubjective, abstract, stereotypical terms -or, if you will, expressing the unfamiliar in terms of the familiar. 27 By describing 'outings' as 'stitching', the metaphor activates conventional aspects of the latter activity suitable to the contexte.g., 'temporary mending', 'part of a healing process', 'leaving traces' -meant to help the reader suspend his standard view of 'outings' and undergo the required gestalt flip.
Metaphorical re-conceptualization is not based on transfer of concrete conceptual structure from physical experience to a more abstract domain. Rather, it involves the contextual recruiting of selected, suitable, conventionally available aspects of a notion to help reconfigure another notion in line with an individual experience or vision: a blend. The 'less clearly delineated' from Lakoff and Johnson's dictum should be understood as 'individually and experientially available', the 'more clearly delineated' as 'intersubjectively and abstractly available'.
In sum, one can say that metaphors articulate a novel vision and so introduce a possible tension into one's standard, or literal, ways of expressing phenomena (Ricoeur 1977) . Depending on the type of metaphor and discourse, this tension varies in strength and scope and puts different requirements on the audience. In the case of metaphorical extensions serving as labels for new entities such as a computer mouse, there is, perhaps, no significant tension: no beliefs to be suspended, no notions reconfigured. In the case of advertising, such as a leaping tiger advertising petrol, the tension is between the conventional and an entity's implied 'emotional aura'. One is not expected to reconfigure the meaning of petrol, merely to view one brand as more desirable than another. If one is so inclined, one can adopt various attitudes towards the entity, depending on context; such framing is exploited mercilessly both by advertising and propaganda. In the case of a new way of life that transforms one's perspective on various aspects of reality -as Thoreau describes -the tension between the conventional and the vision can potentially be strong. One gains access to such novel visions primarily via metaphorical language, which requires one to suspend one's everyday way of grasping things.
To conclude: in the circles in which metaphor is traditionally esteemed, it is a way to express individual revelations, which help extend the vistas of human existence. This is easy to see in the domains of articulation traditionally viewed as opposed to the commonsensical: poetry and philosophy. As opposed to ideology -assuming Thoreau's vision underlies the ideology of the ecology movement -poetic vision is usually intensely private. Normally, it does not invite one to drop -or even suspend -one's everyday view of reality. Rather, one is invited to visit a world of individual experience that need not make any claim to universal significance.
Of course, philosophy does make such a claim. In this respect, it is similar to science, which also abounds in metaphors -necessarily so, if the present account is correct. A philosopher's offer of metaphorical refocusing challenges common sense. It belongs to a communal, never-ending attempt to reveal the contours of the human condition. It does not deny the local, practical validity of commonsensical formulations; instead, it gives them a wider horizon (Pawelec 2009b ). than what it reveals. Following Chomsky's formalist approach to language -valuable within its narrow limits -CMT exemplifies a search for linguistics with a 'human face'. Though it is rooted in the same mentalistic paradigm as Chomsky's generative grammar, it has extended that research agenda enormously. If one accepts that CMT compresses the expressive processes taking place over the history of a linguistic community and the interpretative processes taking place in a particular context into the unconscious mind of a generic human being, then the material collected within the paradigm can help one look for real-life factors that shape one's language and understanding.
CMT REINTERPRETED
Let me start with a detour: a psychological experiment testing CMT's validity. As Keysar et al. (2000) show, reading comprehension experiments do not corroborate the claim that conventional phrases are understood because interpreters mentally activate an appropriate cross-domain mapping.
The researchers report evidence that such mappings may be active when novel phrases are used. Here is one example from the study, testing the conceptual metaphor IDEAS ARE CHILDREN (2000: 585;
As a scientist, Tina thinks of her theories as her children. She is a prolific researcher, conceiving an enormous number of new findings each year. Tina is currently weaning her latest child.
As a scientist, Tina thinks of her theories as her children. She is a fertile researcher, giving birth to an enormous number of new findings each year. Tina is currently weaning her latest child.
The researchers found that it takes significantly less time for subjects to understand the final sentence in the second text, suggesting that only novel phrases activate the mapping. They claim that this result disproves the assumption that cross-domain mappings underlie the comprehension of conventional language while showing that they may underlie comprehension of novel expressions. Is this really so?
In both versions of the text, the first sentence is identical and concerns a female scientist, Tina.
That she 'thinks of her theories as her children' -an explicit mention of the purported conceptual metaphor and a case of psychological 'priming' -is not directly relevant to the next sentence of the first text; therefore it is backgrounded, and the reader must resolve whether the last sentence changes the subject or should be interpreted in light of the first sentence. This takes time. In the second version of the text, the narrator openly adopts Tina's analogy: a creative use of 'giving birth'. Thus, the reader is prepared to interpret the last sentence in that light. The difference between the texts hinges on the flow of thought in discourse (Chafe 1998) . The first sentence establishes the topic of discourse: Tina the scientist. At the same time, it introduces a potential sub-topic -Tina the mother of scientific theories -which is backgrounded in the first text and developed in the second.
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I submit that neither the conventional nor the novel expressions in the text require cross-domain mappings for their interpretation, because such global conceptual mappings make no cognitive senseas I argued in Section Four (see also Section Seven). How is it possible, then, that one understands the final sentence about Tina? Apparently, one relies on local analogy and performs a blend. One knows that the sentence is about Tina's work, presented in terms of maternity. Since weaning is the first step to a child's independence -a contextually relevant conventional association -one may think that Tina is ready to communicate her latest findings. The real difference between conventional and novel phrases may be explained in terms of 'stereotypical adequacy': the former are normally assumed to be 'good enough' 29 to express one's ideas on a subject, while the latter require special justification: in the present example, the narrator -rather incongruously -fleshes out Tina's analogy by describing her work. Still, the phrases that appear in the text, whether conventional or novel, do not pose a significant challenge for interpreters, compared with Thoreau's example, not to mention much poetry and philosophy. Why?
Apparently, because the subject matter -the productive life of a scientist -is socially available as a set of stereotypes. 30 Such platitudes may be expressed extravagantly with novel phrases as in the second version of the text; or, more often, in the standard way, with conventional language. I submit that stereotypes -understood broadly as a community's standard ways of viewing reality -offer a much more viable explanation of one's everyday understanding than the system of conceptual mappings in the cognitive unconscious that Lakoff advocates.
One could profitably inspect the material gathered within the CMT framework while building a cognitive theory of social stereotypes -moving away from methodological individualism in the process. Much of Lakoff's work -especially in the domains of social criticism and political ideology (e.g. Lakoff 1987a Lakoff : 412-415, 1992 Lakoff , 1996 Lakoff , 2008 -openly relies on 'folk models': an analogous notion 28 Keysar et al. (2000: 588-9 ) reject this interpretation; but their argument, relying on other experimental data, cannot be quoted here for lack of space. Crucially, however, they interpret discourse structure in terms of anaphora (cohesion) rather than 'flow of thought' (coherence) (cf. Halliday & Hasan 1976 , Chafe 1994 . 29 Conventional phrases are standard 'stopping orders' in the process of formulating one's intentions (McNeill 2005: 91-92) . 30 See (Zinken 2004) for an exposition on the importance of the notion of stereotype within cognitive linguistics; see also (Putnam 1975 ' (1994: 180) . As is well known, however, Lakoff moved away from this culturally embedded interpretation -except for his political engagements -towards a universalistic and biological agenda.
Zinken (2004) Finally, let me quote at length Brigitte Nerlich (2003: 136) , who advocates adapting Gibson's ecological approach to metaphor study:
31 Returning briefly to the issue raised in Section Two: how can one theorize the relationship between individual metaphorical revelations and a social unconscious system of thought -conceptualized in this paper as a socially available system of stereotypes? This is an important question in the study of historical phenomena, as Gadamer explores in the hermeneutical tradition. I believe that Gadamer's notions of 'prejudice' (1993: 269ff.) , 'horizon' (1993: 302ff.) , and 'style' (1993: 493ff.) are crucial for serious attempts at providing an answer.
Similarly [to Gibson], I have been dissatisfied with the ways some cognitive linguists study metaphor in relatively artificial laboratory settings and conceptualise it as an internal cognitive event and I would like to replace this by a more ecological approach. I want to study the affordances that a certain metaphor has, what it can be actively used for and what it has been effectively used for, and how this changes the metaphor and the way it is used over time. I want to study the interaction and complementarity between a metaphor and its environment of use.… An ecological theory of metaphor would study the 'structural coupling' between a metaphor and the environment, how it is constantly interacting with its (discursive) environment and, in the process shaping the (discursive) environment itself, as well as, more broadly, the sociocultural/economic circumstances of the time(s).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This section is an appendix of sorts. I would like to take up two issues, partly in response to a reviewer's assessment that the paper lacked clear structure and argumentative power. In his thoughtful and clear reflections on metaphor, Prandi writes (2004: 383) : 'metaphor is the only figure that turns inconsistent predication into a form of conceptual categorisation'. This is a more transparent description than I used to differentiate metaphor from other tropes: basically, that metaphor is not just a contextual departure from literal meaning; instead, it offers a new perspective on a domain -even as far as urging its conceptual re-configuration in 'strong' cases.
Prandi continues (2004: 390):
Unlike metonymy and synecdoche, however, metaphor is capable not only of bringing to expression independent and consistent conceptual structures; it is also capable of constructing conflictual complex meanings which impose on concepts unexpected relations. As they can hardly be justified from within the realm of concepts, which are by definition consistent, inconsistent conceptual relations depend, for their very taking shape, on the specific grammatical structure of specific linguistic expressions.
This passage brings to mind Richards' discussion (1965: 117ff.) of the 'ground' of metaphor: i.e., the role of similarity and analogy in making metaphor work. As the passage shows, Prandi divides metaphors into two general types: consistent and inconsistent. The latter rely crucially on linguistic expression ('poetic metaphor') and are not expected to result in definite analogy (Prandi 2004: 400) .
One can link Prandi's assessment with Richards' criticism (1965: 123ff.) of Breton's poetic style, which relies on a juxtaposition of apparently incongruous elements. Metaphorical inconsistency -to be functional -must still be able to convey an 'integral' thought or provide access to a world of private idiosyncratic experience: a task that requires carefully crafted linguistic prompts. What does it means for language to be 'vitally metaphorical': the issue linked with the supposed poetic origins of language? One immediately faces a logical paradox. Since metaphor is defined in reference to the 'literal', it is hard to see how it can be primary. Notice, however, that it is equally hard to imagine the genetic primacy of the 'literal': on pain of circularity, one cannot explain the origins of conventional meaning by reference to convention. The opposition between literal and metaphorical meaning leads to philosophical aporia. 33 In phenomenological jargon, the situation calls for a more 'originary' take underlying subsequent distinctions; in Kantian terms, one searches for the 'transcendental' conditions of phenomena.
Lakoff and Johnson's account is based on the idea that metaphor is embodied and conventional language secondary; indeed, convention is purely epiphenomenal on their account. To justify their terminology, they postulate a 'literal', pre-conceptual level of sensorimotor interactions with the world. Such 'basic concepts' -at this stage, their empiricism gives way to idealism -are extended metaphorically and made available conventionally, in varying portions, depending on the culture.
Their eclectic account gives no cogent reasons why and how such things should happen: put another way, why and how some animals were transformed into human beings.
The alternative account really tries to overcome the opposition between literal, already available meaning and metaphorical, extended meaning. Metaphor is primary, taken to mean 'foundational acts of (attaining) meaning' or 'originary expression'; there is no primary 'literal' level. Consequently, one 32 Perhaps symptomatically, Breton's poem Free Union is a favourite example in cognitive analyses, which focus primarily on conceptual transfers rather than linguistic surface; see e.g. (Lakoff & Turner 1989 : 93-5, Gibbs & Bogdonovich 1999 , Stockwell 2002 The other can be a meaning for one's body only if one could be 'there'. It must be a possibility inherent in one's existence 'here': in being open to its form. One must be able to move to reach it; movement opens the temporal dimension. To notice the other, one cannot just be immersed in it: one must be able to oppose it to oneself, to point to it. This requires a pointer, a sign -something that does not present itself for itself, but as something to pass over in favour of what it directs toward. Such acts of passing over, when a new way of interaction yields a new meaning, may be called metaphorical in the primary sense. Something can appear -be present -only if it is presented by a sign. Put another way, presence presupposes some minimal 'writing': a bodily act of expressing what is; while seeing is always 'reading' what one has already inscribed into reality. To return to my starting point, the dualism of objective presence and subjective interpretation is shown not to be primary. Presence, or appearance, is already interpretive; it rests on minimal tools of expression, of 'language', actualized as simultaneous 'reading' and 'writing': interpretive acts of one's meaningful involvement in reality.
The body is not just something material and able to move. The body is what allows one to realize one's desires -or 'drives', if one prefers a term that covers lower organisms. As the developmental psychologists have shown well, in the case of human beings, one's material body is not one's own from the start: it must be appropriated in action. The material body becomes one's body once it exists as the expression of one's will. Learning to control his 'own' body, the child develops a division between himself and others. In the process, the primary appropriation of the body is, with passage of time,
reproduced on a larger level as he develops habits of interaction with things and with other people.
Through habituation, what was alien and resistant becomes his 'own': the medium for his selfexpression and self-realization. In short, it becomes his extended body.
If this formulation seems farfetched, recall how easily one appropriates the potential for extraordinary movement inherent in vehicles or sport gear: the instruments are integrated into one's 'body schema', becoming 'part of oneself'. Still, the most obvious confirmation of the presence of extended bodies comes from one's deep, existential identification with social collectives, be it through marital union or body politic.
To recapitulate: the dualist divides experience into the passively 'objective' -something simply appears and is present -and the actively 'subjective': one reads things one way rather than another;
one 'puts one's own spin on it'. According to the anti-dualist, something appears only if it is mediated by one's body, which 'writes' and 'reads' simultaneously. At the lower level of sentience, the body 'writes', unconsciously turning the totality of experience into a sign for an existentially important content, be it food, mating partner, or predator; and 'reads', enacting the 'text', immediately following the text's inscription in its behavior. At the higher level of self-consciousness, the body -as system of life support -changes its essence to become the body as system of self-expression. The body 'writes'
as it gestures, producing a material totality to express its intent. The body 'reads' as it recognizes that totality and is able to discover a unified intent in it. Consequently, in Russon's paradoxical formulation In this way, at some point one reaches a stage where a minimally self-conscious body as
represented by e.g. a gang of chimps becomes a self-conscious body one can call a linguistic community. That community can come in various sizes, from a person's somewhat 'schizophrenic' dialogues with himself to Gadamer's notion of the 'conversation' of humanity as a whole. Crucially, the body in question is an intersubjective collective, within which various subjects perform roles ascribed to them by the logic of their community: that is, ascribed in the light of its legitimate aims.
In the relationship of mother and child, the roles are clearly different and -at least at firstextremely unequal. For some time, the child cannot be said to perform its role; rather, it grows into it, becoming self-conscious in the process. Of course, the mother is self-conscious from the start and knows the general logic of this extended mother/child body -as inscribed by her culture, which offers her paradigms of 'good mother', 'normal child development', 'happy family', etc.
While 'reading' the 'text' of her relationship with her child -the history they have written together in unequal parts: their joint autobiography -the mother may encounter obstacles that force her to re-evaluate and consequently re-write the part she plays. 
